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SAFETY MANAGEMENT OF A COMPLEX R&D
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James F. Connors* and Roy A. Maurert
Lewis Research.Center
SUMMARY
A perspective on safety program management has been developed
for a complex R&D operating system, such .as the NASA-Lewis Research
Center. Using a systems approach,, hazardous operations are sub-
jected to third-party reviews by designated area safety committees
and are maintained under safety permit controls. To insure person-
nel alertness, emergency containment forces and employees are
trained in dry-run emergency simulation exercises. The keys to
real.safety effectiveness are top management support and visibility
) of residual risks.
INTRODUCTION
Generally, everyone subscribes to the basic concept of safety;
i.e., the protection of life and limb of personnel, the protection
of facilities and equipment, and the minimization of disruption to
operations. However, there also seems to be a certain amount of
semantics and disparity involved in how the various agencies pur-
sue, organize and manage against these noble objectives. Function-
ally, safety is all pervasive! In the technology business, it en-
compasses virtually all of the technical disciplines. To insure
system effectiveness, safety surveillance of hazardous activities
must extend from womb to tomb, or from concept through operations.
rNote: References 1 through 9- provide the literature backdrops
against which the viewpoints and safety philosophies expressed here-
in are made. Basically, the approach is from the perspective of
safety program managers rather than "experts" in safety.
What then is the so-called "safety man" or the safety engi-
neer? Certainly, there is no single.omniscient individual versed
in all technical disciplines that can provide all the safety so-
lutions. In working with complex systems-, we must bring to bear
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the best expert knowledge available to us and appropriate to the
issues before us. For example, today when dealing with high pres-
sure systems, we must necessarily involve one versed in fracture
mechanics and fracture control---one whose analyses and judgments
we can rely on. With the systems approach, the safety officer's
job is more one of operations review, coordination, management and
implementation of procedures. In the assurance of safety, he must
achieve continuity of surveillance throughout the life cycle of the
activity. Subdividing safety into system safety, aviation safety,
industrial safety, public safety, etc., doesn't appear to make much
sense and only achieves jurisdictional gaps and overlaps. The
safety man's goal is to insure that the right questions are asked:
Have all the hazards been identified? Are the controls adequate?
What could fail? Once the right questions are posed, appropriate
answers can be found or readily determined from studieskeyed to
sound engineering judgment.
The responsibility for overall safety is shared by all; how-
ever, this responsibility increases with each echelon of super-
vision and management, until it finally focuses on the "top man."
Safety program implementation just doesn't happen; it can only be
done in the style and to the degree that top management supports
the program.
Safety necessarily involves the assessment and acceptance of
certain minimum levels of risk. Management in its decision-making
processes must have visibility of the residual risks and alterna-
tives attendant to on-going operations. Hazards and the means for
their control must be clearly identified, considered in appropri-
ate trade-off studies and displayed to the management approval
chain.
COMPLEX R&D OPERATING SYSTEM; LEWIS RESEARCH CENTER
For the present purposes of discussion, the complex R&D ground
operating system (referred to in the title) will be the NASA-Lewis
Research Center. As an operating system, we will be referring to
all in-house Center R&D plant operations. Hopefully, the safety
principles and organizational approaches employed here may find in-
terest and application to other field installations or other com-
plex, potentially hazardous operations.
Let's first examine this particular field installation! The
Lewis Research Center's R&D mission (figure 1) is focussed in
three broad areas; (1) advanced propulsion systems, (2) energy
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and power generation systems for both terrestrial and space appli-
cations and (3) launch vehicles (primarily applications of the
£LH 2 - L021 Centaur stage in support of the unmanned space science
programs). Included is the entire spectrum of airbreathing, chem-
ical rocket and electric propulsion systems. Approximately 55%
of the Center's resources are used in support of the aeronautics
program. Essentially, Lewis is a gas-turbine engine, related tech-
nology laboratory! The attendant diversity of potential hazards is
truly enormous; for example, there are hydrocarbon fuels, cryogenic
fuels and oxidizers, high-voltage plasma rigs, submicron powders,
high-pressure and high-temperature structures and containment ves-
sels, hard vacuum systems, high-speed rotating machinery, radio-
activity, toxic materials, etc. Subsequently, it will be shown
that 650 to 700 separate and diverse activities have been identi-
fied as being hazardous and are under safety permit control.
The Center's physical plant covers some 350 acres and is shown
in the aerial photograph of figure 2. Probably the most unique,
distinguishing characteristic of the Lewis Research Center is its
central air process system. This is in evidence in the photograph
by the large (five- to six-foot diameter) overhead lines that dis-
tribute combustion air (up to 450 psi) and altitude exhaust to the
furthest extremities of the Center. The prime movers for this
system are 5- to 20,000 horsepower compressors and exhausters
located in two main buildings---the Engine Research Building and
the PSL Equipment Building, From this central air system, approxi-
mately 50 to 60 different research customers have process air
conditioned and admitted to their research rig or facility. With
some components more than 30 years old, the system was designed for
versatility, economy and efficiency. In its operation, there is a
high degree of flexibility achieved by the manual setting of valves
to route the conditioned air to appropriate facilities; of course,
there is an attendant price in complexity and hazard! This process
air system is operated around-the-clock on a three-shift basis. To
maintain order and efficiency, it is important that detailed and
effective scheduling of facility operations be accomplished.
Other major facilities that are identifiable in the aerial
photo are two propulsion wind tunnels (a 10-by-10-Foot Supersonic
Wind Tunnel with speeds from Mach 2 to 3,,5 and an 8-by-6-Foot
Supersonic Wind Tunnel with speeds from transonic to Mach 2). The
PSL buildings include four altitude tanks in which full-scale jet
aircraft engines are operated under various conditions of simulated
pressure altitude. Program support aircraft are operated out of the
hangar. In the upper right hand corner are two large space-environ-
ment facilities for evaluating electric propulsion systems in simu-
lated space flight conditions. There is also a zero-gravity facility
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which consists of a vacuum chamber approximately 20 feet in diameter
and 500 feet deep in the ground with a pneumatic accelerator located
at the bottom. (On an up-and-down trip, experimental packages can
achieve approximately 10 seconds of zero-gravity conditions.) There
are some 140 structures at the Center with a plant value of about
300 million dollars.
Of course, one cannot run a plant and facilities such as these
without people! The general array of personnel functions necessary
to operate and manage such facilities are indicated in figure 3.
The Center has a total complement of approximately 3,050; of these,
approximately 1,350 are professional scientists and engineers. As
indicated in the wheel chart, each major facility must operate with
people organized in different functional groups. It is vital that
effective communications and delineation of roles be achieved in
order to establish a true safety awareness among personnel. Train-
ing must be an essential and integral part of the safety program.
PROGRAM APPROACH AND ORGANIZATION
The Center then is made up of people and facilities! This is
the investment that we must protect. The Lewis safety program
cornerstones are identified in figure 4. As indicated, safety must
start at the top with management support and visibility of the
residual risks encountered in day-to-day operations. The safety
program must reside on the sound engineering judgment of its most
experienced and knowledgeable people. We have required that there
be an overall systems approach adopted to the review of individ-
ual operations. We must recognize the responsibilities of the R&D
line management and at the same time achieve a parallel review
channel reporting to top management. In effect, we are to estab-
lish a third-party review process. It is essential that we have
visibility and control of operations. In our case, this is done
with a paper system--the so-called "safety permit" system. The
permit is a paper that stipulates the restrictions, precautions and
requirements for operation and, thus, becomes a basic training and
communication document between the technicians (who do the work)
and the researchers (who generate the requirements). Obviously, a
certain amount of safety documentation must be established and
maintained.
In organizing the safety program, the Center plot plan was sub-
divided into seven geographical areas with boundaries established
as indicatedin figure 5. Each area includes a complex of facili-
ties with some degree of operational similarities and requirements.
Within each, six to eight knowledgeable experienced people are ap-
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pointed by the Center director to form an area safety committee.
By design, the membership of the committee is interdisciplinary in
its makeup. These members serve on a part-time basis (perhaps,
10-15% of their time on safety reviews and apart from their prime
job assignments such as in research or operations. These area
safety committees report to an executive safety board. The func-
tions of the area safety committee are to effect the third-party
review and to issue the safety permits. The permit is a paper re-
flecting the concurrence of the area committee on the proposed
safety plan and is simply a clearance to operate or to proceed with
the activity. The executive safety board is responsible for the
promulgation of safety policy, to resolve any impasse between the
line and the area safety committees, and to provide visibility to
the Center director of the overall safety posture of the Center,
Functional advisory panels are also made up of specialists to co-
ordinate and work with the various area safety committees. There
are two standing accident investigation committees to determine
facts and recommend corrective actions on accidents/incidents as
they arise. The safety director is responsible for the operation
and management of the Lewis safety office and wears an extra hat
as the executive secretary (or the implementing arm) of the board,
THIRD-PARTY REVIEW AND APPROVAL PROCEDURES
A flow chart of safety approval procedures is illustrated in
figure 7 for Lewis in-house operations, As discussed earlier, the
initial burden of developing the safety plan rests with the cogni-
zant project engineer (PE). It is his function to bring his pro-
posed plan to the area safety committee for detailed review. Should
there be established precedence and all questions and challenges
pertaining to safety resolved, then a safety permit will be issued
and the project engineer will find his activity clear to operate.
However, if there are additional findings or unanswered questions
by the area safety committee, there may be several iterations be-
tween the area safety committee and line management before issues
are resolved and a safety permit issued. Impasse and significant
major risk assessment are to be passed on to the executive safety
board and, in certain cases, major elements of risk or cost are
referred with recommendations to the Center director for resolution.
Keep in mind that there is an effort to restrict membership within
the area safety committee to personnel outside direct line manage-
ment responsibilities---so that, in effect, we don't have people
reviewing their own work. In this way, we effect a third-party re-
view parallel to the line. Ultimate responsibility and resolution
of impasse rests at the Center director level.
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SYSTEM SAFETY
Much has been bandied about in the literature relative to "system
safety." Some confusion and, perhaps, suggestion of mystique (or
cultism) seems to hang over it, particularly when one attempts to
define system safety as being something apart from industrial or
institutional safety, aviation safety, public safety, etc. If one
accepts the definition of system safety as suggested in figure 8,
---"a reasoned approach---logic based on facts and engineering
judgment---a systematic study to identify all potential hazards and
to determine means to effectively control or eliminate the hazards,"
then system safety is the name of the game and adequately describes
our approach to Lewis in-house operations.
System safety tools/techniques can be useful in analyzing,
focussing, displaying and dealing with potential hazards. Some are
listed in figure 8 and are defined herein in the Appendix. Com-
plexity of the system will obviously determine the depth and so-
phistication of the safety analysis. This is again a matter of
judgment; obviously, a simple bell-jar-type activity would not in-
volve as much detail as a full-scale engine in a major test facil-
ity. The efficacy of system safety analysis can only be measured
in terms of its impact on the decision-making process. As a matter
of policy and procedure, an operational readiness inspection (ORI)
is required before any new activity is initiated...this is the
final check of the system before committing it to operation!
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SAFETY PLAN
Development of the safety plan is the first responsibility of
the project engineer. Elements to be considered in a comprehensive
plan are suggested in figure 9. For most operations, the technical
literature is replete with safety guideline information in the way
of standards, operating manuals, codes, research data and related
experience. This is then the safety data bank! In each case, how-
ever, the main concern is for the proper and precise matching of
environmental parameters found in the cited literature with the
proposed test conditions. Here again engineering judgment must
prevail! Where appropriate data does not exist, analytic studies
and proof testing must be initiated at system, subsystem or com-
ponent levels.
This perspective on safety standards is further illustrated in
figure 10. Operations that are fairly routine or for which adequate
precedence has been established can be handled as depicted verti-
cally on the left side of the chart. With appropriate citations
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and reference to data bank information, project safety decisions
are made through line management with the safety organization (S/O)
responsible for monitoring, liaison and technical reviews.
New technology, first-of-its-kind projects with little or no
precedent information, must be handled with more detailed physical
evaluations as depicted vertically on the right side of figure 10.
In these instances, proof-type environmental and stress testing
down to the component level must be done in order to reduce the
residual risks to a minimum. An important requirement on devia-
tions from conventional or previous related practice is the docu-
mentation of the technical justification or engineering analysis.
Documentation of successful safety practice becomes guideline
information for subsequent similar operations, until with enough
experience behind us we can recognize the merit of specific pro-
cedures and propose them for consideration as safety standards,
An illustration of this might be the Lewis Hydrogen Manual (ref-
erence 9) which basically is a compilation of Lewis pioneering
procedures and practices in the handling of liquid hydrogen, Doc-
umentation of the final decision rationale is essential since it
in turn becomes the basis for work specifications and safety rules.
It also becomes the training vehicle by which we explain the pre-
cautions and environmental constraints to the technicians who are
to perform the work.
SAFETY PERMIT SYSTEM
In applying for a safety permit, the project engineer must fill
out a standardized request form (figure 11 and ll[a)). For hazard-
ous operations, this form is designed to achieve some semblance of
uniformity in detailing, categorizing and quantifying the hazard
and the proposed safety precautions. Key information would include
delineation of environmental test conditions (pressure, temperature,
voltage, frequency, flows, etc.), materials problems (chemical com-
patibility, toxicity, radioactivity, etc.), sensing and detection
equipment, emissions and effluents, and specified safety precautions
for certain posed situations. An important block to be filled out
is the one indicating precedence for the particular type of work;
in essence, we don't attempt to reinvent the wheel every time!
Signatory blocks are also provided for use by line supervision.
Backup supportive analyses and documentation (including crit-
ical system drawings) must be submitted to the Area Safety Commit-
tee for review and approval. Upon concurrence of the operating
plan, a safety permit (figure 12) is signed by the chairman, issued
and posted in a conspicuous place at the operational site. State-
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ments on the permit briefly describe the activity and stipulate the
safety requirements and the imposed operational restrictions. These
safety specifications then become required basic training for the
supporting technician staff, who are under instructions not to per-
form work outside the scope of or not covered by a safety permit.
All permits must be renewed and updated at least annually.
Because of the great diversity of hazardous activities around
the Center, each safety permit is color coded to provide a quick
ready reference for plant protection personnel who might be called
in to fight a fire. The code simply specifies as follows:
Green: (No unique firefighting techniques are required.)
Take action 
- use Water, Dry Chemicals or CO2.
Yellow: (Fire involving liquid metals, high voltage, etc.)
Take action - use DRY chemicals ONLY.
Red: (Unique - potential high explosive, high toxicity,
nuclear radiation, etc.)
Take action ONLY after advice of a knowledgeable
person (i.e., project engineer).
In all cases, copies of current safety permits are also maintained
by the plant protection staff and become an integral part of their
building inspection patrols and pre-fire planning exercises.
To track the safety permits for operational location and
currency, an automatic data processing (ADP) system is inputted
by local supervisors (Technical Services Building Managers) and
monthly printouts are provided. A sample page of the Facilities
Utilization Report is shown in figure 13. For each building and
room around the Center, operational tasks are described along with
safety permit coverage and expiration dates. Safety concerns and
utilities available to the area or room are also designated in
accordance with the legend at the bottom of the page. Expired
permits are removed from the site and the operations or work stopped,
until renewal is effected through appropriate channels.
CENTER SAFETY OVERVIEW
A representative monthly report summary is shown in figure 13
(a). In effect, we have a compilation of known hazards and a snap-
shot of the operational status for the many rigs around the Center!
For example, at this particular time there were 380 high-voltage/
high-amperage operations, 94 hydrogen rigs, 22 activities employing
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450 psi combustion air, 158 operations using natural gas, etc. Of
the 1136 activities reported, 103 are designed for unattended
operations. There were also 104 permits that would expire within
this reporting period. This Facility Utilization Report is an
excellent operational tool for the building manager and provides
some overall top management visibility of the safety program.
With a great range and diversity of operations occurring in a
relatively congested area, proximity factors become important in
considering the potential for chain-reaction effects, wherein one
accidental failure (or energy release) can, in turn, trigger yet
another accident. A cursory "domino effects" study (based on Armed
Services Explosive Safety Board quantity-distance criteria) was
made of the Lewis fuels, oxidants and gas storage depots (as shown
in figure 14). Separation distances, personnel evacuation zones
and barricades to remove line-of-sight shrapnel were evaluated for
conformance to standard practice and Center policy. Further de-
tailed studies are required. With the level of complexity, other
potential paths for accident propagation are open and must be taken
into account in achieving a systems approach to all safety reviews
of Center activities.
EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT TEAM
Personnel available to aid in emergency containment are shown
on figure 15. The first echelon to combat any engineering situa-
tion is the in-house plant protection staff consisting of 24 full-
time personnel who are charged with manning firefighting equipment
and emergency vehicles. Their backup, second-level reserves are
auxiliary emergency reaction teams, consisting of 50 other employees
who are trained in emergency rescue, firefighting and first aid
techniques and are assigned on-call emergency support roles via
their job descriptions, In a major fire (or aircraft accident),
municipal (or airport) fire-fighting forces would also be called in.
In personnel injury situations, the Lewis Medical Services (a full-
time doctor and two nurses) are available.
How do we insure that the emergency team performs as a well-
oiled machine? One general observation that seems to prevail in
the aftermath of most accidents is that a written operating pro-
cedure or specification had previously existed on paper describing
a proper safe way of doing the particular business. It is obvious
that the mere generation of paper does not in itself constitute a
safety program. It is but a step!
9
PROJECT "STEEP"
In most instances, accidents involve people--human frailties,
errors of omission or commission. Safety instructions too often
are not read, or read but soon forgotten. To circumvent this
shortcoming, Lewis safety training policy is aimed at achieving an
aggressive continuing program of instruction and exercise (or dry-
run emergency drills) tailored to the needs and activities of par-
ticular divisions, Such are the objectives of Project STEEP (Safe-
ty Training in the Execution of Emergency Procedures) as represented
in the logo of figure 16.
Project STEEP is aimed at developing the team concept in achiev-
ing an efficient fast response to posed emergency situations. It
requires delineation of roles to be carried out among interfacing
groups working in a given area; e.g., mechanics and engineers. Sim-
ulation drills will be conducted and designed to exercise the
"teams" in appropriate procedural details. A system of communica-
tions is all important! The range of STEEP activities might include
such exercises as the use of the emergency call system, area evacu-
ation procedures, first aid and heart resuscitation techniques,
general housekeeping, fire-fighting, explosion protection, opera-
tions in emergency protective gear such as the Scott air-pack,
radioactive or toxic releases, etc. These must be coordinated
efforts between Plant Protection, Medical Services, the Safety
Office and the line organizations,
Examples of planned, organized emergency simulation training
exercises under Project STEEP are shown on figure 17. The first
rule in any emergency is to effect a rapid orderly building evac-
uation of all personnel. The response is timed, evaluatedfor
procedural deficiencies and reviewed post-facto with the designated
evacuation monitors. Key operating personnel are trained in first
aid and cardiovascular resuscitation. Mock disaster exercises are
held to review these techniques and to put into practice personnel
rescue procedures. To simulate an actual case, hot fire drills are
conducted periodically. Here, plant protection crews work out with
"light water" (AFFF) hoses on a gasoline pool-type fire. Emergency
reaction team members also participate in the hot fire drills (as
do municipal firefighters, at times) and learn to operate the emer-
gency equipment. Here you see them throwing water and running
flow tests on the equipment.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In closing, the effectiveness of any safety program must rest
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on the support of management and the interest and motivation of the
employees. It must be so ingrained in everyone's mind as to be
recognized as the only way to effectively accomplish the business.
Sound engineering judgment has to be the backbone of the safety de-
cision-making process. While documentation and paperwork (figure
18) in itself doesn't make a safety program, a certain amount be-
comes essential in providing top-management visibility of the safety
issues and the residual risks in operations. It is, perhaps, most
important in working with unique high-energy R&D facilities, such
as we have discussed here. Essential safety documentation can prob-
ably be best defined by post-accident investigation criteria. Sim-
ply, how well were the risks recognized, considered, sized and
managed? At Lewis, the Executive Safety Board minutes are the prime
vehicle for safety overview information. It is the means by which
management obtains some visibility of residual risks in its over-
all plant operations.
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APPENDIX
SYSTEM SAFETY TOOLS/TECHNIQUES
As extracted from the referenced literature, the following assur-
ance tasks are defined herein to clarify terminology and to illus-
trate the logic and analytic methodologies of system safety:
* Hazards Identification and Criticality Ranking:
An examination is made to determine all potential
hazards that might be the result of inherent
properties or characteristics of equipment, material
or human failures, or environmental stresses. It
includes consideration of the interrelationships of
primary, initiating and contributory hazards and all
pertinent circumstances involved in system operations.
Hazards are then categorized in order of criticality,
such as (1) potential loss of life, (2) potential
mission failure, (3) delay or loss of operations and
(4) excessive unscheduled maintenance.
* Preliminary Gross Hazards Analysis:
In the initial phases of development (e.g., siting
considerations for hazardous operations or fadil-
ities), significant energy sources are identified,
quantity-distance criteria are taken into account
and methods are selected for containment and con-
trol of these energy sources.
* Worst Case Analysis; Maximum Credible Accident:
A system in its operational lifetime is exposed to
environments, processes, conditions and loads of
varying magnitudes. The stresses and effects pro-
duced will differ at various times. All of these
and their interrelationships are analyzed for the
worst case conditions that could exist, the most
serious hazards, and the most damaging effects that
could be produced. The term Maximum Credible Acci-
dent is employed to indicate the worst-case con-
dition that can reasonably be expected to occur.
The probability may be extremely low, but not so
low that it would be impracticable to incorporate
suitable safeguards in the system.
* Design Reviews; Fail-Safe Design Philosophy:
This is the independent review and determination
of the adequacy of design with respect to its
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intended functions. This review activity should be
performed on both a continuous and discrete basis.
Safety aspects of the design which are deemed in-
adequate are subjected to a disciplined procedure of
responsible follow-up to assure that corrective
action is taken, documented and verified for efficacy.
Special problem areas within the design are reviewed
and trade-off studies initiated as required to solve
these problems. Documentation of the design review
is required with a complete list of all action items
resulting from the review. Design reviews should be
conducted at various points during the design; a pre-
liminary design review during the early stages of
design, a critical design review near the end of
design, an operational readiness review, and a final
design review after the equipment has been placed in
operation plus informal design reviews throughout
the program. The design reviews provide project
..engineering and program management with the neces-
sary visibility to determine problem areas actual or
potential, as well as possible resolutions to these
problems.
Since failures will occur, fail-safe arrangements are
another means to prevent disabling of a system or to
prevent a catastrophe involving major damage to equip-
ment, injury to personnel or degraded operation. Fail-
safe design insures that occurrence of a failure will
leave the system unaffected or converted to a state in
which no injury or damage can result. Fail-safe
designs can be categorized into three types:
(1) Fail-passive arrangements reduce the system
to its lowest energy level.
(2) Fail-active design maintains an energized con-
dition that keeps the system in a safe mode
until corrective action occurs.
(3) Fail-operational arrangements allow system
functions to continue safely until corrective
action is possible.
Development Test Analysis:
Design uncertainties are resolved and design decisions are
finalized by a means of the results of development tests.
The development test program (including the test procedures
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as well as the test results) is an excellent source of
system effectiveness, strength and efficiency information.
This analysis should be a vital adjunct to the system effec-
tiveness assessment activity.
* Failure (Hazard) Mode and Effect Analysis:
This is a system analysis which is initiated in the early
stages of design and considers the mode (function), the
mechanism "(hardware/software) and cause (chemistry, physics
or human) of possible failures together with the effects of
such failures on the system operation, consequence of fail-
ure to the system objectives, probability of occurrence for
each possible failure, deterrents to obviating the failures
from occurring, and all corrective action required to pre-
vent the failures from happening. A tabular analysis is
prepared for systems, subsystems, components or parts. It
is initiated in the early stages of development and/or
design but is continually updated throughout the life cycle.
During early conceptual studies, this analysis is used to
delineate, in order of severity, those critical functions
and related hardware which can lead to specific consequences
to given mission objectives and/or crew/personnel safety.
During the developmental phase, the F(H)MEA is a primary
tool for design evaluation. The analysis is later used
during the test phase as an input for checkout procedures
and test emphasis as well as fault isolation. In the oper-
ational phase, the F(H)MEA aids in selection of alternate
modes of operation under primary failure as well as in
preparation of both prelaunch and inflight diagnostic pro-
cedures. Logistically, the analysis finds application in
determining allocation of spare parts and selection of
field personnel,
* Fault Tree Analysis:
This graphic analysis traces by means of Boolean symbology
the relationship of all minor events which contribute to
the occurrence of a major undesired event in a system.
This analysis has two major elements. The first is the
logic diagramming, known as a Fault Tree, which connects
by means of "and" and "or" gates events (known as sub-
events) which contribute to the terminal undesired event
of interest. The second element consists of the subevents
themselves. These subevents are normally limited to the
"what" of an incident rather than including how, why, who
or where. While the FTA is a decisionary tool, it is
primarily a motivational tool during early system con-
ceptual activity. The full merit of the FTA is not real-
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ized until the development phase because the branches
of the Tree cannot be traced to sufficient depth to
influence design. During this phase, the emergency of
certain paths as being more critical than others causes
designers to revise their approach. A unique purpose of
the FTA is to provide a system view of the impact of an
undesired event, thus allowing every person who contributes
to a system to see and understand how they might be conse-
quential in an undesired event.
O Life Testing:
A comprehensive test technique, life testing examines and
verifies the deleterious effects of long term steady-state
operation of equipment. Also, the testing verifies the
effects of storage and shelf-life aging of components.
Both life testing and stress testing should utilize statis-
tical design-of-experiment techniques in test planning to
facilitate objective analysis of the significance of varied
test conditions upon the parameters tested and to maximize
information per dollar from test programs. Good techniques
to compress life testing in a meaningful way are needed.
The specific purposes of life testing are to demonstrate
the life expectancy of the hardware under normal operating
conditions of load and environment; to determine the
effects of storage of the hardware in a nonoperating mode
under actual or simulated storage environments; and to
determine the shelf-life of the hardware considering non-
metallic materials aging, lubrication deterioration or loss
of lubrication, metal migration, and other related factors.
* Environmental Stress Testing:
This test technique is applicable to system elements which
are more sensitive to environmental stresses than to long-
term operation. Design margins are determined by means of
testing to failure under specified conditions of stress.
This approach is applicable to those items which are not
destroyed at each level of stress in order to observe .their
response(s). Stress testing relates failure rates to oper-
ating stresses under controlled or measured environments.
The stress environment must represent the true environment
to provide meaningful results. These data are used as
inputs to establish functional relationships between fail-
ure behavior and associated parameters under various time
and stress conditions. Then, the functional relationships
are utilized for comparative evaluations of new processing
techniques and new device types, realistic initial and end-
of-life- specification limits, oand parametric prediction of
15
failures.
* Trade-Off Studies:
This task covers the establishment of system effectiveness
requirements and capabilities in various times during the
system engineering process. A uniform and identifiable
process is required for logically comparing total system
effectiveness regardless of system purpose, size, or com-
plexity. This task must produce quantitative or proba-
bilistic results if it is to be a decision-making tool,
The measures of effectiveness should be based on mission
objectives. These measures, together with other compar-
isons such as total system cost, are used as inputs to
the decision-making process for choice of best alternative.
This occurs at all stages of the system engineering process
that is a part of every new or upgraded equipment acquisi-
tion and operation. Trade-off studies completed in the
concept definition phase are used to arrive at the best
concept. Major decisions are made at the system level as
to which concept is the most feasible in terms of effec-
tiveness, cost, and all other criteria necessary for de-
cision. Trade studies are used during system definition
phase to aid in selection of the best alternatives for
use at the subsystem and component level, and during
design definition to design level decisions.
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SAFETY PROGRAM CORNERSTONES
* Center safety policy and organization
* Top management support and visibility
4 Decision basis; sound engineering judgment
o Systems approach
* Third-party reviews
o Safety permit control of operations
O Safety training and communications
o Safety documentation
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Figure 8
SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS
- a reasoned approach or logic based on facts and
engineering judgments to define clearly the safety
issues and alternatives for effective decision-making
- a systematic study to identify all potential hazards
and to determine means to effectively control or
eliminate the hazards
SYSTEM SAFETY TOOLS/TECHNIQUES
- Hazards identification
- Preliminary gross hazards analysis
- Worst case analysis; maximum credible accident
- Design reviews; fail-safe design philosophy
- Development test analysis
- Failure (Hazard) Mode and Effects Analysis
- Fault tree analysis
- Life testing
- Environmental stress testing
- Trade-off studies
Figure 9 - ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN A COMPREHENSIVE
SAFETY PROGRAM
SAFETYOCCUPATIONAL SAFETY TECHNOLOGY ESEARCH
MEDICINE AND DATA BANK HUMAN FAILINGS RESEARCH
HEALTH AND ERRORS SYSTEM SAFETY
PROGRAMS PUBLISHED STANDARDS TECHNIQUES
PROJECT EXPERIENCE HAZARDS
REQUIREMENTS KNOW-HOW IDENTIFICATIONI RISK ASSESSMENT
MISSION ENGRG. BALANCING OF
FUNCTIONS ACCIDENT I DETERMINATIONS TRADE-OFFS
FACILITIES HISTORIES TECHNICAL
MANAGEMENT FAILURE RATE JUDGMENTS
DESIGN INFORMATION PROJECTMANAGEMENT
ENGINEERING REDUNDANCY-FAIL TESTING OF DECISiON
DESIGN SAFE DESIGNS HYPOTHESES]
S R1LE'RIA
- RIA SINGLE POINT AND SAFETY PLAN SAFETY
SYNERGISTIC TESTS PERFORMANCE IMPLEMENTATION
ELEMENTS SPECIFICATIONS MONITORING
Z0 COMPONENTS PROCEDURES EMERGENCY ACTIONS
SUBSYSTEMS RESCUE OPERATIONS
SYSTEMS FACILITIES
OPERATIONS
AND
MAINTENANCE
Figure 10 - PERSPECTIVE ON "SAFETY STANDARDS"
CONVENTIONAL NEW TECHNOLOGY
INDUSTRIAL-TYPE R&D OPERATIONS,
O.PERATIONS PROJECTS, MISSIONS
7, T r 7- r I I I I 1 r rr" 7 7r 7 r 1/ , , /-77777777
NASA SAFETY DATA BANK
SAFETY G/L INFORMATION I MANDATORY CONSIDERATIONS 1 NASA SAFETY
(PUBLISHED GUIDES, CODES, (REGULATORY, HEALTH, RESEARCH
MANUALS, TECHNICAL PAPERS IDENTIFICATION MARKINGS, - - - -
€BY NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED IAGENCY WIDE STDS, ETC.) I ACCIDENTII ANALYSES
GROUPS, ETC.) OSHA L
PROJECT MANAGEMENT S/O ENGINEERING EXAMINATION
CONCFPT -- - PARTICIPATION t-- BY PROJECT MANAGEMENT
DESIGN I MONITORING - INPUT: EXPERTS WITH
FAILURE ANALYSES S - -MOST RECENT DATA
CONSTRUCTION SPECS. - DESIGN REVIEWS
- SYSTEM ANALYSES
(BALANCING OF TRADE-
OFFS AND SAFETYIRISK
ANALYSES)
-TESTING: PROCF
QUALIFICATION
ACCEPTANCE
@COMPONENT AND SYSTEM LEVELS
PROJECT DECISION S/O -"PROJECT 0 PROJECT MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
COORDINATION,
SAFETY DETER- DEVIATIONS FROM CCNVENTIONAL
,.1GNAL PAGE IS MINATIONS OR PREVIOUS RELATED PRACTICE
R&1?00R QUA]LTfY
JOB SPECIFICATIONS TECHNICAL JUSTIFICATION
SAFETY RULES DOCUMENTATION
S/O = SAFETY ORGANIZATION
G/L = GUIDELINE
Figure 11
SAFETY DATE Permit No.
COMMITTEE PREVIOUS
SAFETY PERMIT REQUEST USEONLY NEW
INSTRUCTIONS: Prepare and send one copy of this form to each as shown. If required (see LMI 1703.1), attach pertinent drawings, hazard
analysis and Users and Experience Record (NASA-C-I97) for:
Cleveland requests: Lewis Safety Officer Plum Brook requests: Lewis Safety OfficerArea Safety Committee Chairman Area Safety Committee Chairman
Area Safety Committee Reviewer Area Safety Committee Reviewer
Plant Protection Safety Officer at Plum Brook
Test Installations Division Facilities Service DivisionProject Engineer (Responsible Engineer) Project Engineer (Responsible Engineer)
O 7- AREA SAFETY COMMITTEE NO. -
F PROJECT ENGINEER NAME (Responsible Engineer) ORG. CODE PAX PBX MAIL STOP
1. ACTIVITY (Describe research operation, facility, equipment, etc., requiring safety approval.)
2. LOCATION (Room, building, cell, etc.) 3. DRAWING NOS. 4. WORK UNIT NO.
5. TESTS (Nature of objectives, etc.)
6. EXPECTED DURATION DATES 7. TEST RUNS
START LENGTH: TIME: [ WORKDAY
NIGHT
COMPLETE ... ..- -- L WEEKEND
8. TEST CONDITIONS (List the most hazardous conditions; use of fluids, power, radiation, etc.)
MATERIAL, VOLTAGE, FREQUENCY QUANTITY
FLUID, PRESSURE, TEMPE RATUR. REMARKS
ETC. ETC. ETC. AT SITE IN RIG
9. MATERIALS DESCRIPTION ("X" Blocks for materials to be used.)
E TOXIC ] CORROSIVE I EXPLOSIVE
,1 PYROPHORIC RADIOACTIVE [L OTHER (Specify)
I0. DESCRIPTION OF RADIATION AND/OR RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL (Complete and attach Users Radiological Training & Experience
Record (NASA-C-! 97) for each user.)
PHYSICAL FORM: TYPE OF RADIATION:
ELEMENT OR
7 SEALED SOURCE [,ALPHA IGAMMA COMPOUND
IUNSEALED SOURCE [ BETA _ NEUTRON ELEMENT OR
COMPOUND WEIGHT
_ GAS -] OTHER (Describe,if such
as X-ray producing RADIOACTIVE
equipment.) ISOTOPE
E- LIQUID WEIGHT % RAD. ISO.
] SOLID IN ELEMENT/COMP.
ACTIVITY CURIES
11. RADIATION DETECTION -INSTRUMENTS
NASA-C-923 (Rev. 9-69) Previous editions are obsolete. Page 1 of 2CS-52590
ORIG NAG PAG
£luqI1 PAGE IS
VEYOOR PUALITY Figure 11(a)
12. IS THERE A PRECEDENT FOR THIS WORK 7 13. NASA-C-197 (attached) YES NO
(If aYes", gi  detaills.) (Names)
Yr ES .... . ---...------
NO _
14. DISCHARGE PRODUCTS (Radloactive, corrosive, combustbhle.toxic and alr/water pollution materll.)
PRODUCTS (Temperatroe, MEANS OF COPING WITH FINAL DISPOSAL
Quantity. Radloacti e. Etc.) DISCHARGE PRODUCTS MEANS REMARKS
15. SAFETY PRECAUTIONS (Indicate what proviason has been made for the folnwmvfn typical nems.)
SITUATION SAFETY PRECAUTION
A. Ventilation
i Detection of hazardous condition
a toxicity, etc.)
c. Ignition sources
o. Safe location of personnel during
tests
E. Avoidance of unsafe contamination
of fuel or oxidant
F. "Fail-Safe" means in case of power.
pressure, combustion or personnel failure
G. Protective means in case of over-temper-
ature, over-_ressure_ orlerseed
H. Accident Procedure (Fire, explosion, spill)
I. Collapse of vessel from evacuation
J. Personnel protection (Protective clothing, breathing
..... paratus, medical check, etc.)
K. Grounding
L. Guarding of live parts
M. Shielding (Radioactive material, radiation producing
equipment, and high frequency radiation)
N. Hazard-warning signs
16. SPECIAL ITEMS (LisI pertinent items peculiar to cotditions of propoRed tes)
PROJECT ENGINEER (SIgnture) DATE SUPERVISOR (Saratire) DATE
NASA-C-923 (Rev. 9.69) CS-52591 Page 2 of 2
Figure 12
NOTE: COPY OF SAFETY PERMIT REQUEST MUST BE POSTED WITH THIS PERMIT.
SAFETY AREA
2
PERMIT NO.
2-1238
DATE ISSUED EXP(RATION DATESAFETY PERMIT "-"-WORK UNIT NLU BJIJT ASK)
REPLACES PERMIT NO.
2-1150
LOCATION (Room, building, cell, etc.) DRAWING NOS. CD-502891 (Affix color coded sticker here. )
CF-500873, CF-502887,
SE-7, ERB CF-502886. Layout and
installation diagrams
ACTIVITY (Describe research operation, facility equipment, prO yd d.safely approval.) This color is . . .. GREEN
AUTOMOBILE ENGINE EXHAUST EMISSION STUDIES
An automobile gasoline engine with various emission con- TAKE ACTION
trol devices drives a dynamometer. A max. of .2 gpm of USE
gasoline is supplied to the engine from a 1000 gallon Water, Dry Chemicals, or CO2
trailer parked outside the cell. A max. of 10 SCFM of H2gas may be supplied to the engine from the H2 distribution
system. A max, of 2 SCFM of a H2-CH4 gas mixture may be EMERGENCY CONTACT PHONE
supplied to the engine from a bottle located outside the (Knowledgeable person)
test cell. The cell ventilation is supplied by a 10,500 P. R. Meng 777-8542
CFM fan drawing air in from the basement and cell and (Alternate)
exhausting to the roof. Flow of H2 and H2-CH4 to the cell R. Behrendt 777-0627
is limited by sonic flow orifices. Engine exhaust is water-cooled and ducted to
atmospheric exhaust. Up to 4 SCFM of engine exhaust gas is passed thru various
emission analyzers located in the control room and ducted outdoors. The analyzers
use span gases containing trace amounts of CO, C02 , CH4 , and C6 H14 in N2 from the
cylinders located in the fuel storage room. Zero gas is N2. A H2 generator supplies
a max. of 200 SCC/min. for the flame in the HC analyzer.
ACTIVITY APPROVED FOR SAFETY SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:
1. The engine installation must be checked for gas/oil leaks before each run.
2. The gasoline supply to the cell must be automatically shut off and the engine shut
down in the event of:
a. Electrical power failure
b. Ventilation system failure
c. Detection of gasoline vapor in the test cell or fuel storage room in a concen-
tration greater than one-half the combustible limit.
3. In the case of a gasoline supply line break, the cell ventilation system shall
dilute the gasoline vapor in the cell (including basement) to a concentration of
less than one-half of the combustible limit,
SAFETY APPROVAL REQUESTED BY
(project Engineer's name)
Phillip R. Meng
AREA SAFETY COMMITTEE ACTIVITY COMPLETED
REVIEWED Y APP (Chairn) DATE SIGNATURE
R. A. Dawson E. W. Corsetti
SINSTRUCTIONS
Area Safety Committee Chairman Project Engineer (Responsible Engineer)
After.approval of the Safety Permit Request (NASA-C-923), 1, Post o copy of this permit, together with o copy of the
complete~this permit in accordance with procedures prescribed Safety permit Request, in a conspicuous 
place at the
in LMI 1703.1C and send one copy to each of the following location described.
for: 2. Submit a new Safety Permit Request (NASA-C-923) at
CLEVELAND PLUM BROOK least 30 days prior to the expiration date if:
Plant Protection Lewis Safety Officer a. the activity will not be completed 
by the expiration
project engineer (Resp. Eng.) Plum Brook Station Safety Officer date;
Office of Environmental Proiect engineer (Raesp En.) b. ony change is moade in conditions as described 
in
Health (When applicable) Safety & Security Office (F.S.D.) this permit.
Safety Off " 3. When the activity is completed, remove this permit,
Saety O indicate the completion date, and send it via the
cognizant Area Safety Committee chairman through
the Office of Environmental Health to the Safety Office.
- ( 7NASA-Lewis.
NASA-C-919 (Rev. 2-73) 0 I N D P G 1
MR fT~l1 fOF ITW4 RUAL=a~
Figure 13
JOB NO. 30024-B TECHNICAL SERVICES FACILITIES UTILIZATION REPORT
BY LOCATION
BUILDING NO. 16 ELECTRIC PROPULSION RESEARCH *JAN. 17, 1975 PAGE 29
LOCATION TASK S PROJ ENGINEER SAFETY SAFETY ITEMS OTHER FLOOR UTILITIES SC
86 ROOM RIG U DESCRIPTION PERGOTE A B C D E F 6 H J K L M SAFETY SPACE N P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
0016 140 02 YAC0016 A REDINGER N/A
ELECTRICAL SHOP BUILDUP AREA A
0016 .146 01 YOS6001 A BANKS 101
GRID FABRICATION -ION THRUSTER- 09/75 X 0 HI TEMP 542 X X A
0016 146 02 YOS6005 A BANKS 102
2000 DEGREE FURNACES 09/75 X HI TEMP X X X C
0016 150 01 YOVS176 A COLES 74
HOMOPOLAR GENERATOR 08/75 x x NAK 1872 0 X A
0016 150 02 YACDO16 A HAGEDORN N/A
CORBLIN NEON COMPRESSOR X X X X 0 x X A
0016 150 03 YOV4717 A MEYN 73
WATER MAGNET MAGNETIC FIELD STUDIES 08/75 X X X MAG. FIELD 0 X A
0016 150 04 YAC0016 A HAGEDORN N/A
INGERSOLL RAND HELIUM COMPRESSOR X X X X X C
0016 156 01 YACOD16 A HAGEDORN 121
HE COMPRESSOR PLANTS 1 & 2 & HE PURIFIER 11/75 X X X X 1140 0 X X AU
0016 156 02 YACO016 A HAGEDORN ** 135
CV1 HELIUM GAS PURIFIERS 11/74 X X X X X x AU
0016 160 01 YOV4708 A MORGAN 114
NEON CRYOMAGNETS 1 & 2 SUPPORT SYSTEMS 10/75 X X X 1290 0 X 8
0016 160 02 YOV6078 A MORGAN 120
MHO INITIAL MAGNET CHECKOUT TESTS 10/75 X X X X XX MAG FIELD 0 X X B
0016 160 05 YOV6078 A JENTNER N/A
MHD TEST SUPPORT SYSTEMS X X B
0016 166 01 YACO16 A REDINGER N/A
UTILITY SERVICE 374 A
0016 168 01 YACOD16 A REDINGER N/A
MODEL PREPARATION & ASSEMBLY AREA 168 A
0016 170 01 YAC0016 A HAGEDORN N/A
NEON PLANT X X X 3371 0 X X C
0016 170 02 YAC0016 A REDINGER N/A
MAGNET ASSEMBLY AREA A
*SAFETY LEGEND* *UTILITIES LEGEND*
A-HYDDOCARBONS B-H.VOLTAGE/AMP C-H.S. ROTATION D-H. PRESS GAS N-CADDE/ADP P-ALT. EXHAUST 0-40 PSI C. AIR R-125 PSI C.AIR
E-OXYGEN F-RADIATION G-MERCURY H-LASER S-150 PSI C.AIR T-450 PSI C.AIR U-C. T. WATER V-IND. WASTE SYS
J-CRYOGENICS K-HYOPOGEN L-NITROGEN M-TOXIC MATERIAL W-NATURAL GAS X-FUME HOOD Y-440 POWER Z-CO-2 SYSTEM
Figure 13(a) - FACILITIES UTILIZATION REPORT
FINAL TOTALS
A-HYDROCARBONS 185 N-CAODE/ADP 106
V-HaVOLTAGE/AMP 380 P-ALT. EXHAUST 72
C-HoS. ROTATION 151 0-40 PSI C. AIR 70
D-Ho PRESS GAS 322 R-125 PSI C.AIR 165
E-OXYGEN 59 S-150 PSI CeAIk 37
F-RADIATION 122 T-450 PSI C.AIR 22
6-MERCURY 81 U-C. T. WATER 131
H-LASER 31 V-IND. WASTE SYS 231
J-CRYOGENICS 276 W'NATURAL GAS 158
K-HYDRO6EN 94 X-FUME HOOD 209
L-NITROGEN 314 Y-440 POWER 342
K-TOXIC MATERIAL 186 Z-CO-2 SYSTEM 107
ACTIVE 1136 UNATTENDED OPERATION 103
BUILD UP 134 TOTAL ITEMS 1465
INTERMITTENT 83 TOTAL EXPIRED 104
DORMANT 111 SU-APPROVED 1041
EMPTY 1 SU-NO APPROVAL 379
SU-NOT APPLICABLE 45
Figure 14 - "DOMINO EFFECTS" STUDY
FUELS, OXIDANTS, AND GAS STORAGE AREAS OF LEWIS RESEARCH CENTER
1 MILLION LB HI-TENSILE
TEST IN LH2 (2500 GAL) FRACTURE
COMPRESSED -MECHS. AREA
GAS FUEL
STORAGE DRUMS SUB p POWDERS,
I RI \ " RADIOACTIVE MAT'LS.
AIRCRAFT FUEL o
20, 000 GALS ZERO-GH 2 1800GAL\ FAC. LH2 -1800 GAL
- GH2 - 130, 000 c. f.
LH2, LO2 Im. Im. - - -- GH2 - 31, 000 c. f.
HC, COMP. AIR,
AMMONIA, METHANE, .. .ORL - LH , LO
EXHAUST SYSTEMS 2 2
NATURAL GAS COMPRESSOR 300 PSI CAP. LH2-L02  SMALL ROCKETS
UNDERGROUND GASOLINE '7
STORAGE 150,000 GAL IN 6 TANKS
PSL - JP-5, HYDRAZINE ~ -L02 - 6700 GAL
LH2, LO2, JET ENGINES G02 -100,000 c.f.
/ LH2 STORAGEI 4
MAGNETICS, VAC.,He LIQUEFACTION \ 45,000GAL
Ce, NaK, NEON, HI-VOLTAGE WIGGINS TANKS (4) Lg SPACE TANK100, 000 GALS VAC. - HI-VOLT. 
-GASOLINE Ce, Hg
Figure 15
Ei-;RGENCY CONTAINMENT MANPOWER
* In-house Plant Protection Staff (24)
o Emergency Reaction Teams (50)
Municipal Fire-fighting Forces
Medical Services (doctor and two nurses)
31
Figure 16
PROJECT "ST E E P"
S RH CENTER
LEWIS RESEARCH CENTER
Figure 17 - EMERGENCY SIMULATION EXERCISES
BUILDING EVACUATION MOCK DISASTER
HOT FIRE DRILLS ERTS
Figure 18
SAFETY DOCUMENTATION
4 Operational Safety Policy (distributed and issued as
a Lewis Management Instruction)
8 LeRC Operational Safety Manual
* Safe-T-Grams, safety training reports, safety statistics,
and accident reporting
* Requests for safety/health operating permits (identi-
fication of hazards, analyses, safeguards, and
operating restrictions)
* Safety permits (posted in all potentially hazardous
operating areas)
* Facility ad hoc committee reports on safety and
operations. SAR's.
p Executive Safety Board minutes (management information,
coordination, policy, and overview). Overall Center
risk assessment.
pJ
